Strike Stories: Neil Kinnock
, 13 December 2024
In this series of Strike Stories we hear the highs and lows of that life changing year through the eyes of miners, families, police officers and politicians as they recall what life was like in 84–85.
The Strike Stories form part of the Streic 84–85 Strike exhibition which is on display at National Musem Cardiff until April 27 2025.
© Richard Williams
There was never any such thing as an immortal colliery. Everyone ever connected to the mining industry recognised that reality. But like any sensible being, I wanted change involving closures to have been thought through, grounded in fact, justified in real economics and geological analysis with a rationale behind it all. That was a strategic view which took account of the energy needs of our country and the well-being of communities. The Government accepted none of these purposes. Nationalised British coal was a financial burden and the Miners’ Union a militant impediment to a closure programme. Both had to be eliminated.
There are instances of developed countries organising the shift away from extractive industries and heavy manufacturing by preparation and compensation, consultation, local planning, re-training, encouraging inward investment. None of that meaningfully occurred in the UK. Closure of industry meant abandonment of community. Levelling down of security, incomes, physical and mental fitness, social capital, cultural vigour.
Apart from the overall national significance of the coalmining industry, the issues were political and personal for me. In 1984 there were 6,000 coalmining workers in my Constituency and they included several friends. My Dad, extended family members in Tredegar and Aberdare, both of my Grandfathers, six of my Uncles, were all miners at some time. One was a face captain in Tower Colliery which became the last one to close in South Wales. Employment around both towns related to coalmining, including steel and much of engineering. Mam, who was a District Nurse, brought me up to believe that miners were the greatest men and that areas like ours were the most productive and strongest communities.
There had always been pithead ballots – although, over the decades, national strikes hadn’t been a common way to resolve issues. From the 1926 General Strike to 1972 there hadn’t been a national miner’s strike. The 1974 national strike, the one that’s said to have brought down the Heath Government, was preceded by a national pithead ballot. In 1984, however, Scargill managed to avoid putting a strike Resolution to the Special National Conference of the NUM, therefore by – passing a democratic ballot. This was because he thought that he’d be beaten if he allowed a vote – he’d already been defeated in ’83. He was determined to rely on mass picketing instead.
I – and a lot of miners – knew that was a huge risk: not having a ballot would definitely divide the workforce and it also reduced the likelihood of sympathetic support from other workers in transport, power stations and docks. When I and others put this reality to Scargill our views were ignored.
Scargill was an intelligent man and a brilliant mob orator. All of history, realism, common sense said that it was stupid to rely on the confrontation of mass picketing. But when he simplified the dispute by putting the challenging question ‘Whose side are you on?’ it was impossible for people – especially young miners whose livelihoods depended on a future for coal – not to be caught up in the enthusiasm, especially when they were told that coal stocks were almost exhausted and the Government was wilting.
Arthur Scargill issued demands and orders from the platform and from his office in Sheffield – but there was no strategy. After the strike had started – ironically by accident – he offered the confident semblance of a deliberate, cogent process, but it didn’t exist except in his mind. Scargill had no plan. By searing contrast, Thatcher’s government very definitely had a strategy, and the means and mind to put it ruthlessly into effect.
- The Prime Minister appointed Ian McGregor as the chair of the National Coal Board. He had a “tough guy” reputation, built as a corporate boss in the USA and reinforced during his time Chairing the British Steel Corporation.
- Her government enacted legislation that removed benefits from the families of strikers.
- She co-ordinated British police forces in a way that was unprecedented, using the Home Office and Association of Chief Police Officers to produce a national organism never seen before or since in the UK.
- And, vitally, she ensured a stockpile of coal at record levels – about 40% larger that ever before and deposited at power stations, coke works, and docks.
She had made these preparations for disruption to the power supply following her reluctant settlement of a coalmining pay dispute in 1981 and on the basis of the “Ridley Plan” compiled by one of her Ministers following the fall of the Heath Government in 1974 – a defeat which had left the Conservatives with an aching ulcer of resentment.
The government were well-prepared for a prolonged dispute. But they could never have anticipated two development that favoured them very strongly: First, they never assumed that the Miners would strike without a ballot, secondly, they never dreamed that a coal strike would begin in early spring. Both were elements that would clearly work against the miners. The Government had resources at their fingertips and, as extra advantages, they were given the weather and division in the mining workforce. The miners had endless courage and determination and a practical Case for Coal – but nothing else. Picketing miners versus working miners, with the police, often in huge numbers with regimental organisation, cavalry and dogs holding the ground in between. They described themselves as ‘The meat in the sandwich’.
Given the intensity of feeling and the attitude of some police units, conflict was inevitable. In traditional mining towns and villages, where the policemen had been seen as dependable people who were part of the community, the relationship was smashed. Families, and in some areas neighbourhoods, were divided. “scabbing” was treated as a mortal sin. In some localities where majorities continued to work, striking was regarded as treachery. As the strike wore on for a year - and for years in the wake of it - there was debt, destitution, high unemployment, mental anguish, division and deep anxiety. People sought to overcome all of this with immense fortitude. Families pulled together and communities became closer. But that was not universal. Family break-up, foreclosed mortgages, delinquency and suicides increased.
One positive development that emerged on the coalfields was that was that, during the strike, women took leadership roles. Collectively, they ensured the things that mattered were sustained: every family had a meal, every child had something to unwrap at Christmas, no- one had to feel like a recipient of charity because everyone was contributing something.
Over a relatively short time, soup kitchens evolved into community organisations that were properly organised around strategic thinking and financed from donations by local people, other trade unions at home and abroad and incessant fundraising. Some women travelled throughout the UK and, often, abroad to actively make the case for coal and communities.
They flourished in these roles, frequently providing a quality of leadership that was not offered by some of the men in their communities.
In July and September 1984, together with Stan Orme, who handled Energy in the Labour Shadow Cabinet, I compiled proposals to manage pit closures through a process of independent expert examination and economic evaluation. The National Coal Board accepted them. Scargill personally turned it down flat without showing it to any of the NUM Executive. As Stan (a lifetime trade union activist) said “Arthur’s not a trade unionist – he doesn’t believe in negotiation”.
Ultimately, the strike is a story of heroism - and of the abuse of that supreme quality.
Neil Kinnock, politician, MP for Bedwellty and Islwyn 1970-94, Leader of the Labour Party, 1983 – 1992.
